ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS AS AN ANTICORRUPTION MECHANISM: THE MEXICAN CASE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL, 2005-2008

Abstract

Penalties to public officials destined to detect both performance failures and acts of corruption are undoubtedly essential surveillance instruments to the well-being of any democratic system. However, the implementation of these instruments entails important organizational and strategic challenges which must be taken into account. In other words, the mere existence of norms and regulations is not sufficient, since the details of their implementation are critical, i.e., for what purpose and in which way these instruments are used (it is different, for example, if the supervision and prosecution aim to reduce administrative errors or corrupt acts). This article presents a primary attempt to analyze the penalties applied to Mexican federal public officials between 2005 and 2008. The aim is to examine and identify if there are certain basic criteria through which the Mexican federal government is implementing this control and surveillance mechanism. The tentative answer from the collected data is that there is no apparent explicit strategy which defines basic and homogeneous criteria for the implementation of these sanctions, thus greatly weakening the struggle against corruption or for administrative improvement through these instruments.